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ABSTRACT 
 
Causality between Financial Development and  
Economic Growth: A Case Study on Selected  
Middle Eastern Countries. (May 2005) 
Massa W. Alrayes, B.B.A, The American University of Beirut 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dennis W. Jansen 
 
 This study empirically investigates the hypothesis of causality between 
financial development and economic growth in seven Middle East and North African 
countries from a time series perspective. I use ordinary least squares and vector auto 
regression estimations to infer Granger Causality, after controlling for a set of non-
financial variables. Results show evidence of unidirectional and bidirectional causality 
between financial development and economic growth in four cases, no causality in two 
cases, and no significant relation between financial development and economic growth 
in one case. The significance of the relations varies on case-specific basis. I also control 
for three indices of civil liberties, economic and political freedom, and find significant 
evidence of an impact on GDP in three out of seven countries.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The link between financial development and cross-country economic growth 
rates has been widely discussed in the empirical and theoretical academic literature. 
Developed countries have well functioning financial markets, high GDP per capita, and 
moderate growth rates of GDP per capita. The less developed countries have little in the 
way of modern financial markets, low GDP per capita, and often low growth rates. 
Sizeable research finds that financial development boosts overall economic growth, 
which suggests evidence of causation running from financial development to economic 
growth.    
Past work in the field asserts that the level of financial development is a good 
indicator of economic growth (Levine 1998; Rousseau and Wachtel 1998).  Calderón 
and Liu (2003) find that financial development generally leads to economic growth and 
that short run bidirectional causality exists as well. King and Levine (1993) conclude 
that “finance seems to lead economic growth”. Amaral and Quintin (2004) quantify the 
importance of finance for economic development based on a dynamic general 
equilibrium model, and find that finance matters only when the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labor is low. On the other hand, Arestis and Demetriades (1997) 
note in an empirical cross-country time series analysis that “financial development can 
not lead to economic growth”. Edison, Levine, Ricci, and Slok (2002) do not find 
sufficient evidence to reject the hypothesis that international financial integration does 
not improve economic growth even after accounting for economic, financial, 
institutional, and policy characters in 57 countries. One of the controversial questions is 
whether this correlation between financial development and growth indicates causation, 
and in which direction? Other issues that might be considered are long run bidirectional 
causation, nonlinearities, and threshold effects between financial development and 
economic growth. Shan, Morris and Sun (2001) study nine OECD countries and China 
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in a VAR context, and find evidence of bidirectional causality in five of the countries 
and reverse causality in three others. Hansen and Rand (2004) analyze Granger-causality 
between foreign direct investment and GDP in a sample of 31 developing countries. 
Using estimators for heterogeneous panel data they find evidence of bi-directional 
causality between the ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to GDP and the level of 
GDP, and support of the hypothesis that FDI causes growth. Rioja and Valev (2004) find 
that finance has a strong positive influence on productivity growth in more developed 
economies, while in less developed ones the effect on output growth occurs primarily 
through capital accumulation rather than productivity acceleration. Shachmurove (2004) 
argued that improvements in the social living standard in the Middle East that may stir 
economic prosperity for the region will only be attained through fiscal and political 
reforms. Levine (2001) pointed out the special importance of settling the issue of 
causality in developing countries as the answers would help policy makes determine 
areas of most urgent reform.  
One line of argument suggests that the abundance and variety of financial 
instruments and institutions reduces transaction costs for economic agents, which stirs a 
country’s climate for trading and investment, subsequently generating economic growth. 
As economic development differs among countries, special concerns build up when 
attempting to study less developed ones. This study looks at the general issue of 
financial development and economic growth within seven Middle Eastern countries. The 
importance of the Arab region comes from the connection between countries in the form 
of cultural, social and demographic characteristics. In addition, economies have been 
historically dependent on agriculture and the export of natural resources. Nevertheless, 
with the trend of globalization dominating economies some countries managed to have 
flourishing growth through encouraging private investments and providing access to 
larger markets. On the other hand, other economies are still facing the challenge of 
liberalizing their financial systems. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) finds that private 
investment in the region has been held back by political instability, excessive 
government intervention, protection and regulation, and inadequate human capital. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
 This study compliments the existing empirical work on causality, and addresses 
the question of causality proposed by Al-Tamimi, Al-Awad, and Charif (2002) between 
financial development and economic growth for selected Arab countries. I use the same 
the same set of countries they study except Kuwait, due to the absence of statistics 
between 1990 -1991 because of the Gulf War. Their study addresses the long and short 
run causality question between financial development and real GDP growth. They 
suggest a strong long run relation between the two variables based on failing to reject a 
multivariate co-integration test at the 5% level of significance in five out of six cases. 
Short run causality appears weak based on the rejection of bidirectional Granger 
Causality test results at the 5% level of significance in seven out of ten cases. My 
approach varies in the sense that I do not attempt to address long-run causality and 
therefore, do not use co-integration techniques. However, I attempt to assess the short 
run causality matter in a deeper manner through: (1) carefully defining three different 
proxies for financial development rather than one, (2) controlling for five exogenous non 
financial variables after characterizing each variable in detail  (3) investigating the effect 
of civil liberties, political, and economic freedom indices (4) estimating the relation in an 
OLS setting to determine the level of correlation, then examining VAR and causality (5) 
using the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test for stationary instead on the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller non-stationary test.  
The time period used to analyze each country varies depending on the 
availability of data. Countries and years of the study are the following: Algeria (1970- 
2003), Egypt (1960 – 2003), Bahrain (1975 – 2003), Jordan (1977– 2003), Morocco 
(1959 – 2003), Saudi Arabia (1972 – 2003), and Syria (1964 – 2002). The statistics for 
Bahrain have been collected for years preceding the period used for this study, however, 
GDP, Exports and Imports were collected for the first time on 1975. Observations are 
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collected one period before the beginning of each time span since some variables are 
defined as averages from previous years. 
Perhaps the biggest problem of this study and the literature on finance and 
growth in general, is the lack of a complete database on the economic statistics of 
developing countries. Poor quality or even completely missing data makes it difficult to 
study developing countries. According to Levine 2003 “the biggest data problem 
involves the lack of accurate empirical proxies of ‘financial development’, because it is 
difficult to construct consistent, accurate measures of financial development for a broad 
cross-section of countries”. Moreover, since the term “Financial Development” does not 
have an agreed upon definition in literature, different proxies have been used to capture 
it effect.  Levine (2004) discusses an extensive list of answers to what financial 
development means. Among which are producing information and allocating capital, 
monitoring firms, easing exchange, and pooling savings. Levine (2002) constructs a 
dataset on the size, activity and efficiency of various components of the financial system. 
In this study, different measures of financial markets, functioning of banking systems, or 
measures of economic well being in a country are assumed to be equally acceptable 
proxies for “Financial Development”, since no extensive database had been complied for 
detailed financial measures in the set of countries I attempt to study. I construct financial 
development variables for the set of countries studied following the methodology 
specified by Demirguc-kunt and Levine 2001.  
Sources of statistics utilized for this study are mainly the International Financial 
Statistics online database since it proposes the most up to date, comprehensive database 
across time and countries, and the Energy Information Administration’s official website. 
While the lack of comprehensive statistics creates a major obstacle for researchers in the 
field of finance and growth in general, studying developing regions like the Middle East 
further impedes efforts in that direction. One problem is that countries considered for 
this study have joined the IMF less than sixty years ago, so studying the region in a time 
series context becomes a challenge because of the low number of observations available. 
Another is that IMF had been constantly improving the quality of data by either 
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narrowing down or widening specific categories of statistics. This is why certain 
categories may have stopped being reported or some series may contain sudden jumps 
due to changes in the compiling procedures. A third problem is the Middle East had 
hosted several wars and major political events that reflected on the economic 
performance of different countries with varying effect. This makes it hard to collect 
consistent measures of cross country variables. Therefore, an attempt to address the 
question of causality between development and growth in the Middle East is very likely 
to produce results that can not generalize to other countries. At the same time it is not 
clear that results for other countries apply to the Middle East. I further expect my 
conclusions to be challenged by additional research in the field as improved databases 
come into use.  
The general purpose of this paper is to assess the effect of different economic 
measures on real per capita GDP, a proxy for the level of economic development, and 
measures of financial development.  I base the analysis on three sets of explanatory 
variables, namely six control variables, three financial development measures, and three 
indices that measure freedom. Control variable are inflation, government expenditure as 
a share of GDP, openness to trade, oil prices, and capital per capita to proxy productivity 
per individual (See the Appendix A for detailed descriptions).  
Financial development variables are: the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, the 
ratio of private credit to GDP, and the share of deposit money bank assets from total 
assets. Liquid Liabilities to GDP (LIQUIDITY) is used as a broad indicator of financial 
intermediation. Private Credit (PRIVATE) is used as a proxy for measuring the activity 
of financial intermediaries. The relevance of this variable comes from the fact that it 
focuses on indicators of private sector activity in an economy as opposed to the both 
private and public sector when measuring the size of financial intermediation. DEPOSIT 
is defined as a measure of the relative size of financial intermediation. Levine and 
Demirguc-kunt 2001, chapter two, propose DEPOSIT as the ratio of indicators of 
financial sector assets to GDP, where financial sector indicators are central bank, deposit 
money banks, and other financial institution assets. However, due to lack of 
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simultaneous availability of data on all the three financial sectors, an alternative 
indicator was used for measuring the relative size of financial development as developed 
by King and Levine (1993) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000). They measure the 
relative importance of deposit money banks assets relative to central bank assets. I 
modify this measure by taking the ratio of deposit money bank assets, to total, as 
opposed to only central bank assets, due to lake of consistent time series statistics on 
central bank assets. My attempt is to capture a measure of the size of bank deposits in an 
economy and assess its effect on a country’s economic growth performance. 
Countries in the Middle East vary in terms of economic advancements depending 
on diverse institutional characteristics (strength and flexibility of financial, level of 
corruption, legal, and political systems). According to Gwarthney, Holcombe and 
Lawson (2004) changes in institutional quality exert a positive impact on growth and 
countries with higher quality institutions, as measured by the Economic Freedom of the 
World (EFW) Index, achieve more growth per unit of investment.  Consequently, I will 
attempt to assess the effect of a country’s economic freedom, civil liberties, and political 
freedom on growth potential through utilizing the indices that measure those 
characteristics. The three indices are the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW), 
Political Freedom (PL), and Civil Liberties (CL) Index, because of their availability 
across time for this specific set of countries. EFW (by the Frazer Insitute 2005) is 
measure indicators of a country’s economic environment through researching the 
following areas: 1) size of government expenditures, taxes, and enterprises, 2) legal 
structure property rights, 3) access to money and international trade, and 4) regulation of 
credit, labor, and business. Both indices are measured based on a checklist of questions 
derived in large measure from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Political 
freedom measures the right to vote, compete for public office, and to elect 
representatives who have a decisive vote on public policies. Civil liberties include the 
freedom to develop opinions, institutions, and personal autonomy without interference 
from the state (Freedom House 2003). Thus, I shall test whether controlling for those 
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indices produces significant OLS coefficients, and if so whether it they produce 
significant VAR results. 
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows: First I describe the time 
series being investigated for each country and present graphical presentation and some 
preliminary statistics of variables. I provide a brief explanation of some obvious patterns 
in the series by indicating changes in data gathering procedures or intuitive explanations 
related to historical events that had affected a country’s economic performance. Then, I 
perform the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin unit root test to determine whether 
variables are stationary. Next, I attempt to find the most significant relation between 
economic growth and financial development through estimating three sets of Ordinary 
Least Squares regressions. After that, I use the model containing the most significant 
explanatory variables to estimate a VAR. Finally, after controlling for exogenous 
variables, I obtain the impulse response functions and Granger causality for the VAR 
and conclude my findings accordingly. 
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CHAPTER III 
EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 
The general methodology I follow in evaluating the direction of causality 
between economic growth and financial development consists of the following steps: 
1-  I perform the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test to infer 
whether a series is stationary (See Enders 2004 for Unit Root Tests). KPSS 
has the null hypothesis that the variable is stationary. I do not use the 
Augmented-Dickey Fuller (ADF) test for stationary because it has low power 
due to the small number of observations on hand.  However, I do take into 
consideration the cases where the ADF test rejects a unit root, because a 
rejection implies a strong conclusion with the low number of observations on 
hand. A unit root test is not performed for the variables: DEPOSIT and 
TRADE, since they are ratios and are expected to be in the range between 
zero and one, and thus are unlikely to have unit root. I begin by evaluating 
the LM statistics on a series with an intercept at the 5% significance level. If 
the test fails to reject that a series is stationary, I conclude that the variable 
does not have a unit root and is therefore stationary. In case the test with an 
intercept reject that a series is stationary, I perform a test with an intercept 
and trend. If the test rejects that a series is stationary at the 5% significance 
level, I conclude that the variable has a unit root and thereafter needs to be 
differenced.  
2-  I evaluate an OLS regression using two lags of all the stationary variables on 
the series of RGDP or the differenced series of DRGDP depending on which 
is stationary based on the KPSS test results (See Wooldridge 2003 for 
regression estimations). I include a trend in the regression in case at least one 
variable is stationary when testing with a constant and a trend in the KPSS 
test. The trend is only dropped in cases where it is highly insignificant or in 
case including the trend produces econometrically inconsistent results such as 
    
 
9
a regression coefficient that is larger than one, (example Saudi Arabia). When 
estimating an OLS regression, I first begin by regressing RGDP, the proxy 
for economic development, on a set of control variables. Then, I sequentially 
drop the most insignificant variables until I obtain a model of a complete set 
of significant explanatory variables. Second, I use the last model and estimate 
it after adding a set of financial development variables. Then, I also 
sequentially drop the most insignificant variables until I obtain a model of a 
complete set of significant explanatory control and financial development 
variables. Third, I use the final model and estimate it with a set of indices. 
The last model in the system is that obtained at this stage, where all variables 
are significant after accounting for the effects of financial development 
variables and indices.  
3- I estimate a vector auto-regression using the last model obtained in the 
previous step. In cases where the trend, oil prices or any of the indices are 
significant, I control for the effect exogenously. Then I obtain impulse 
response functions and granger causality from the VAR estimates and 
thereafter conclude the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth accordingly (See Kennedy 2003 for more technical 
information).   
 
SAUDI ARABIA 
 Data for Saudi Arabia economy covers the period 1976 – 2003. I attempt to 
associate variations in the series to major economic and political event in that country. 
After the 1973 embargo, prices of oil continue rising until the early 1980’s, expanding 
the Kingdom’s GDP, exports, and capital stock. The graph of inflation show a 
significant drop after 1976, as the Kingdom suffered high inflation after assisting in the 
1973 Arab-Israeli War through imposing the embargo. The Kingdom witnesses its first 
serious rebellion in 1979 when strict Islamists protest what they see as the corrupting 
influence of Western culture. This might explain the sudden drop in government 
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spending between 1978 and 1981(Encyclopedia Britannica 2005) After 1981 the 
government supports Iraq in its war against Iran, and takes initiative establishing modern 
state-of-the-art industrial cities during the peak oil revenue phase. This explains the 
sudden rise in the series of government spending and financial development indicators. 
Then petroleum prices drop, ending with the oil crash of 1986. This explains the drop in 
GDP near that time. 
I choose the time span starting in 1976 because of an improvement in the IMF 
collection process thereafter. The change in data collection procedures creates an 
unrealistic discrepancy in figures before and after 1976, which is why I restrict the 
sample to post 1975 (IFS Country Notes). Within the time frame of 1976 - 2003, 
descriptive statistics illustrate that deposits compose an average 42% of total assets, 
while liquid liabilities and private credit compose an average proportion of 0.99, and 
0.79 from GDP, respectively. Skewness statistics indicate that the observations on 
LIQUIDITY (+ 0.25) and DEPOSITS (+0.26) are skewed left, with a long positive right 
tail, and PRIVATE (-0.32) is skewed right.  The distributions are flat for all three 
financial development variables.  When conducting the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-
Shin test with a constant, five out of six variables reject a unit root at the 5% significance 
level, except LIQUIDITY which requires a trend to confirm stationary. The trend 
required for LIQUIDITY seems visually obvious in the graphical representation of the 
variables.  Moreover, I choose to difference LIQUIDITY, because the Impulse Response 
Function for the non-differenced variable appears explosive. INFLATION also proves to 
be integrated of degree zero according to the Augmented-Dickey Fuller unit root test 
with intercept, with a t-statistics -6.258 significantly larger than 5% significance value of  
-3.653. Although the variable LNOIL proves stationary on the period 1959 – 2003, the 
longest time period used for this study, it appears to have a unit root when tested for the 
restricted 28 year time period used for Saudi Arabia. I, therefore, difference the variable 
before using it for estimating OLS and VAR.  
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 First, I estimate an OLS regression of RGDP on two lags of all six control 
variables without a trend variable∗. After filtering out the non-significant control 
variables, the relation trims down to the following equation of significant variables.  
e)2(GOVGDP23.1)1(GOVGDP31.0
)1(CAPOP33.0)2(RGDP85.0)1(RGDP06.1371.3RGDP
+−−−+
−+−−−+=
  [1. A] 
 This implies an overall negative relation between two lags of government 
expenditure and GDP with a cumulative coefficient of -0.92 - obtained by combining the 
values of coefficients on both lags –. A positive relation exists between RGDP and its 
two lags with a cumulative coefficient of +0.21. A positive relation also exists between 
the first lag of capital per capita and RGDP with a coefficient of +0.33. The signs on 
coefficients indicate a relation that goes in tandem with economic theory, in the sense 
that higher capital , and arguably lower government spending ought to enhance a 
country’s overall productivity.  
Second, I add two lags of the level of the two financial development variables 
and the difference of LIQUIDITY to the former OLS estimation and obtain the 
following reduced form equation of significant variables: 
e)2(PRIVATE67.0)1(PRIVATE32.0
)2(RGDP95.0)1(RGDP27.116.4RGDP
+−−−+
−−−+=
    [1.B] 
PRIVATE appears significant in the former regression. However, cumulative signs of 
coefficients do not seem to accord well with economic theory. Since we expect proxies 
for financial development to have a positive influence on RGDP, the OLS results, thus 
far, are disappointing. Finally, I estimate a model with both control and financial 
development variables after adding the two indices on political freedom and civil 
liberties (The Economic Freedom of the Word index had not been estimated for Saudi 
                                                 
∗ I first estimated an OLS regression with a trend variable, and after filtering out the non-significant 
control and financial development variables, I obtain a relationship between RGDP and the following 
variables: trend, the first lag of the variables TRADE, INFLATION and RGDP, and the first and 
second lag of differenced LNOIL. It becomes clear that the model can not be econometrically 
plausible, because the coefficient on the first lag of RGDP is larger than one. It also appears that the 
coefficient on the trend is insignificant; therefore, I follow a different approach by dropping the trend 
variable.   
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Arabia). As the index on political freedom does not appear statistically significant, the 
final model explains economic growth in Saudi Arabia as a function of an index of civil 
liberties CL-KSA, the first and second lags of RGDP and PRIVATE.  
ksa_CL09.0)2(PRIVATE7.0
)1(PRIVATE43.0)2(RGDP85.0)1(RGDP22.149.4RGDP
−−−
−+−−−+=      [1.C] 
 The final model has a relatively strong explanatory power (R-squared of 91%) in 
comparison to [1] where R-squared is 88%. Using the significant variables obtained 
from the final OLS model, I begin the second step of the methodology by estimating a 
VAR (See Appendix B for VAR details). The cumulative sign on the coefficient of the 
explanatory variables along with the impulse response functions indicate a significantly 
positive effect of RGDP on its lags. According to the impulse responses the relation of 
RGDP to its lags appears highly significant in the first three years and declines then 
becomes insignificantly negative for three periods then dies out in the long run. The 
impulse responses show that PRIVATE appears to have a significant and increasing 
effect for the first two years. Four years into the shock its effect on RGDP begins to 
steadily decline and produces a big negative effect with confidence bands falling in the 
negative region. Effects neutralize in the long run and the impulse response has almost 
no long run effect on RGDP which insures that the series is stationary. As a final step I 
performed Granger Causality test. It indicates a significant bi-directional causality 
between RGDP and PRIVATE. Granger causality suggests that PRIVATE, as a proxy 
for financial development, has a significant unidirectional inverse causal relation with 
economic growth also referred to as “demand-following” causality. And RGDP, as a 
proxy for economic growth, suggests a “supply- leading” phenomenon. Table 1.C 
reportS P-values and Chi-squared statistics which expresses the significance of causality 
for each variable. The folloing pages present tables for summary statistics of variables 
(table1.A), and results of the KPSS test (table 1.B). Additionally, a graphical 
representation of all series is presented in (figure 1.A), and the impulse resposes of the 
VAR estimation (figure 1.B).  
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FIGURE 1.A -VARIABLES – SAUDI ARABIA (1976 – 2003) 
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TABLE 1.A– SUMMARY STATISTICS  - SAUDI ARABIA 
  (28 observations) 
 RGDP DEPOSITS LIQ DLIQ PRIV TRAD INF CAPOP GOVGDP LNOIL 
 Mean 5.72 0.42 0.99 0.07 0.79 0.80 0.02 4.21 0.28 3.36 
 Median 5.71 0.37 0.92 0.06 0.82 0.76 0.01 4.08 0.27 3.20 
 
Maximum 6.37 0.65 2.07 0.25 1.32 1.03 0.27 4.85 0.39 4.28 
 
Minimum 5.36 0.24 0.15 0.01 0.12 0.56 -0.03 3.73 0.16 2.60 
 Std. Dev. 0.25 0.14 0.50 0.05 0.32 0.16 0.06 0.32 0.06 0.46 
 Skewness 1.04 0.26 0.25 1.79 -0.32 0.26 3.41 0.47 0.16 0.59 
 Kurtosis 4.06 1.45 2.41 6.89 2.58 1.63 15.47 1.93 2.52 2.31 
 
TABLE 1.B – UNIT ROOT TESTS - SAUDI ARABIA 
 
 Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test   
 Intercept  Trend and Intercept  
 LM-statistics LM-statistics  
 1% 0.739 1% 0.216  
 5% 0.463 5% 0.146  
 10% 0.347 10% 0.119  
Saudi Arabia (28 Obs.)    
RGDP  0.215922  * 0.120883 I(0) at 5% intercept 
INFL  * 0.371956  ** 0.149449 I(0) at  5% ADF intercept 
CAPOP  * 0.357535   I(0) at 5% intercept 
LIQ  ** 0.683745  * 0.125033 I(0) at 5% trend† 
LNOIL  ** 0.499705  *** 0.104302 I(1) difference 
PRIVATE   0.248551   * 0.141854 I(0) at 5% intercept 
Signifcance level at the 1% leel (***), 5% level (**), 10% level (*) 
      
 
TABLE1.C - GRANGER CAUSALITY - SAUDI ARABIA 
 
Hypothesis  Chi-Squared Probability  
Nature of Causality  
(Bidirectional causality) 
PRIVATE does not cause RGDP  11.74 0.003 
Reject Hypothesis 
(Supply-leading causality) 
RGDP does not cause PRIVATE 7.02 0.030 
Reject Hypothesis 
(Demand-following causality) 
 
                                                 
† I difference LIQUIDITY because the impulse response function of the non differenced variable is 
explosive. *,**, *** indicate significance at  10%,5%, and 1% respectively. 
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FIGURE 1.B – IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS  
– SAUDI ARABIA 
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SYRIA 
Oil had a major impact on the Syrian economy since 1968. Revenue flows from 
exporting oil substantially enhanced the economy’s production. Graphically this shows 
up as a rise in most series between 1970 and 1981. For 1978 and the early 1980s, oil-
export earnings increased by over a billion dollars, as did Arab aid (Plaut - 1999). When 
world oil prices began to slide in 1981, aid from Arab states was reduced and workers' 
remittances fell. After a positive balance of payments (the current account) in 1979 and 
1980, eight consecutive years of deficits followed∗.  In the mid-1980s, Damascus 
defaulted on its external debt. The authorities reacted by imposing ever greater 
restrictions on imports; the market reacted with a major growth in smuggling**. Inflation 
in prices meanwhile became an issue with reported food prices rising by a factor of 
about three between 1987 and 1994.  
Descriptive statistics for financial development variables indicate that deposits 
comprise an average 40% of total assets, while liquid liabilities and private credit 
compose a proportion of 46% and 13% of GDP, respectively. DEPOSITS ratio fell to its 
lowest value of 23% in 1985, during the period of import restrictions. Skewness statistics 
indicate that the observations on LIQUIDITY (+ 0.15) and PRIVATE (+1.78) are 
skewed left, with a long right tail. The distributions are peaked for PRIVATE, 
approximately normal for DEPOSITS, and flat for LIQUIDITY (Table 1.A).  According 
to the KPSS test with intercept, all variables except LIQUIDITY prove to reject the 
presence of a unit root at the 5% significance level of 0.463. LIQUIDITY fails to reject a 
unit root when performing a test with a constant; however, repeating the test with a trend 
makes the series stationary. This conclusion may also be confirmed by examining the 
series visually, and gives a reason for including a trend in the forthcoming estimations . 
After I regress RGDP on trend and a set of control variables with two lags, then 
                                                 
∗ Unless otherwise stated, the data are from the Central Bank of Syria, Quarterly Bulletin (various issues); 
and the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (various issues).  
** The Economist, Nov. 7, 1987, p. 66 
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sequentially eliminating the least significant, my initial OLS estimation provides the 
following results: 
e2)3.9GOVGDP(1)(1.91GOVGDP2)0.18LNOIL(
1)0.14LNOIL(1)ION(0.66INFLAT1)1.16RGDP(0.44TREND0.55GDPR
+−−−+−−
−+−+−++−=    [2.A] 
The former equation shows a positive relation between RGDP and INFLATION, 
TREND, and the first lag of RGDP. The sign on the variable INFLATION appears 
unexpected, as the behaviors of consumer’s prices are likely to relate negatively to that 
of productivity. However, government expenditure has a cumulative negative coefficient 
of -2, indicating that less government intervention is more desirable for enhancing the 
economy’s productivity. This conclusion appear particularly true considering the 
communist ideology of the ruling Syrian Baa’th Party. LNOIL shows a cumulative 
negative coefficient of -0.04 which may seem troubling for an economy that generates 
the bulk of its national income from oil revenues. However, since Syria is considered a 
secondary oil exporting country ,when compared to major OPEC members, we may 
argue that as higher oil prices the dominate consumers are more inclined to purchase oil 
from countries that afford lower costs of extraction, and therefore, lower prices.This 
translates into a negative relation as indicate by the former equation.  After adding 
financial development variables and filtering out non significant ones, the following 
equation is obtained: 
e)1(DEPOSITS77.0)2(GOVGDP66.2)1(GOVGDP73.2)2(LNOIL2.0
)1(LNOIL069.0)1(INFLATION5.0)1(RGDP07.1TREND004.05.0RGDP
+−+−−−+−−
−+−+−++−=  [2.B] 
Equation [2.B] expresses the same signs of the effects obtained earlier through 
equation [2.A], except that the sign on government spending seem to have altered to 
reflect a positive coefficient of +0.07. DEPOSITS is the only financial development 
variable that shows a significant effect on real GDP with a positive coefficient. Finally, I 
estimate the former model after adding estimated indices of the country’s civil liberties, 
political, and economic freedom. Both political and economic freedom indices prove 
insignificant, and the resulting model is: 
eSYR_PF086.0DEPOSITS62.0)2(GOVGDP76.1)1(GOVGDP35.1
)2(LNOIL15.0)1(LNOIL07.0)1(RGDP823.0TREND004.065.1RGDP
+−+−−−+
−−−+−++=  [2.C] 
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The variable government shows a negative cumulative coefficient of -0.41.The 
altering sign on the variable government from negative in [2.A] and [2.C] to positive in 
[2.B], indicates its ambiguous effect although a negative coefficient seems to have a 
more significant P-value 0.07 at the 10% level. A negative sign also gives a better 
understanding of the country’s circumstances. LNOIL seems to maintain its negative 
effect on RGDP, and well as the political freedom index. When higher numbers on the 
PF_SYR index represent less freedom, we expect to have a negative coefficient on the 
index. Political freedom, therefore, enters the regression with a negative coefficient that 
is significant at the 5% level. Equations [2.B] and [2.C] have an equal explanatory 
power, R-squared 94%, while [2.A] has a slightly lower explanatory power with an R-
squared of 92%, but all three seem to represent a fairly decent fit for data. 
I then estimate a system of equations in a VAR context after controlling exogenously for 
the trend, prices of oil and the political freedom index (Appendix contains VAR details). 
Impulse response functions show a significant negative effect of GOVGDP on RGDP 
which carries out six periods into the future with large negative confidence bands (figure 
2.B). In the long run, it continues to have a negative effect with partly positive 
confidence interval which approach zero toward the end. On the other hand, impulse 
response functions   seem to show an insignificant positive effect of DEPOSITS on 
RGDP, which appears to become negative and insignificant in the long run with wide 
confidence intervals. Granger causality (table 2.C) implies no causality between the 
proxy for financial development and economic growth. However, a significant 
bidirectional causality seems to exist between government expenditure as a share of 
GDP and RGDP as a proxy for economic growth. The folloing pages present tables for 
summary statistics of variables (tables 2.A), and results of the KPSS test (table 2.B). A 
graphical representation of all series is presented in (figure 2.A). 
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FIGURE 2.A - VARIABLES♦ - SYRIA (1964 – 2002) 
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
                                                 
♦ CPI rose from 16.7 in 1985 to 24.3 in 1986 in response to an inflationary period, which explains some of 
the soars and drops in the graphs. 
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 TABLE 2.A – SUMMARY STATISTICS - SYRIA 
(39 observations) 
 RGDP DEPOSIT LIQ PRIVATE TRAD INFL CAPOP GOVGDP LNOIL 
 Mean 6.12 0.40 0.46 0.13 0.52 0.10 4.49 0.17 3.08 
 Median 6.07 0.39 0.49 0.12 0.54 0.08 4.56 0.16 3.08 
 
Maximum 6.60 0.51 0.73 0.30 0.78 0.47 5.29 0.24 4.28 
 
Minimum 5.82 0.23 0.24 0.05 0.33 -0.04 3.57 0.11 2.05 
 Std. Dev. 0.23 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.10 0.50 0.04 0.64 
 Skewness 0.46 -0.33 0.15 1.73 0.23 1.54 -0.20 0.18 0.04 
 Kurtosis 1.92 3.15 2.06 5.92 1.77 6.40 1.95 1.72 2.06 
 
 
TABLE 2.B – UNIT ROOT TEST - SYRIA 
 Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test   
 Intercept  Trend and Intercept  
 LM-statistics LM-statistics  
 1% 0.739 1% 0.216  
 5% 0.463 5% 0.146  
 10% 0.347 10% 0.119  
Syria (31 Obs.)     
RGDP  0.120886   I(0) at 5% intercept 
INFL  0.177878   I(0) at 5% intercept 
CAPOP  0.204576   I(0) at 5% intercept 
LNOIL  0.21245   I(0) at 5% intercept 
LIQ  ** 0.652835  0.11494 I(0) at 5% trend 
PRIVATE   0.20223     I(0) at 5% intercept 
Significant at the 5% level (**) 
 
 
TABLE 2.C – GRANGER CAUSALITY - SYRIA 
Granger Causality for Financial Development Variables   
Hypothesis  
Chi- 
Squared Probability  
Nature of Causality 
 (No causality) 
DEPOSIT does not cause RGDP 0.164435 0.9211 
Fail to reject the 
hypothesis   
RGDP does not cause DEPOSIT 2.363146 0.3068 
 Fail to reject the 
hypothesis  
       Granger Causality for Non Financial Development Variables 
        Hypothesis Chi- Squared Probability  
Nature of Causality 
(Bidirectional Causality) 
GOVGDP does not cause RGDP  17.27903 0.0002 Reject the hypothesis  
RGDP does not cause GOVGDP  14.29087 0.0008 Reject the hypothesis 
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FIGURE 2.B – IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS – SYRIA 
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MOROCCO 
 We notice a single jump in government expenditures as a share of GDP and 
inflation series in 1975, which is explained by the Spanish withdrawal from Western 
Sahara, leaving Morocco and Mauritania in dispute during that year. Also successful 
economic reform in the early 1980’s implemented a chain of efficient resource allocation 
shifts, like privatization, that result in an expansion in GDP at an annual average rate of 
4% during the 1980s. Exports rose from 18% of GDP in 1965 to 25 % in 1990. 
 Descriptive statistics show that deposits compose an average of 71% of total 
assets; liquid liabilities comprise an average proportion of 0.27 of GDP . The variable 
PRIVATE is not constructed for Morocco due to lack of sufficient data. The distance 
between the maximum and minimum value is larger for LIQUIDITY than that of 
DEPOSITS, and the respective standard deviations are 0.14 and 0.27. LNOIL varies 
most for Morocco with a standard deviation of 0.64, explained by large changes in oil 
prices. The Kurtosis statistics are less than 3 for all variables except INFLATION (3.24). 
This indicates a flat distribution for all variables, and a slightly peaked one for inflation. 
The KPSS unit root test has an LM–statistics on INFLATION and LNOIL of 0.177 and 
0.306, respectively. All values fall below the 5% statistical significance level of 0.463 
and are statistically insignificant. Thus, the series prove to be stationary when modeled 
with an intercept. I do not include a trend in the OLS estimation because variables 
proved to reject a unit root with out having to model them with a trend.   LM-statistics 
on RGDP, CAPOP, and LIQ are statistically significant and should therefore be 
differenced in order to be stationary. 
 Similar to the prior analysis I continue the exercise of estimating an initial OLS 
regression of the growth in real GDP per capita DRGDP on the six control variables. 
Equation [3.A] shows the estimates of this regression, where the coefficient on inflation 
enters with a negative sign confirming the predicted theoretical relation between the two 
variables. The P-value on inflation is significant at the 5% level (0.04). The coefficient 
on TRADE has an overall negative sign, showing a relation that contradicts with 
economic theory.  However, after adding financial development variables the coefficient 
    
 
23
on the second lag of TRADE drops out as insignificant, while the first lag on DEPOSITS 
enters with a significant negative coefficient. Equation [3.B] shows that trade has a 
significant positive relation with the growth of RGDP, P-value (0.01). But DEPOSITS 
enters with an negative sign, although the number of observations used for Morocco (42) 
is relatively bigger than that used for other countries.  All three indices of institutional 
quality drop out in the third OLS estimation as insignificant (see Excel file for OLS 
results). R-Squared on all three estimations has a relatively low value of 23%. This 
confirms our doubts about the direction of the relation between DEPOSITS and DRGDP 
suggested by the coefficients of the OLS estimation. 
e)1(INFLATION4.0)2(TRADE4.0)1(TRADE33.0058.0DRGDP +−−−−−+=  [3.A] 
 e)1(DEPOSITS204.0)1(INFLATION76.0)1(TRADE38.002.0DRGDP +−−−−−+=  [3.B] 
 VAR estimation of the former remaining set of independent variables on DRGDP 
produces the impulse responses in figure 3.B. Both TRADE and INFLATION have a 
significant negative effect on DRGDP during the first four periods, which becomes 
neutral in the long run. INFLATION has a significant predictable effect, with narrow 
confidence bands through out the ten period impulse responses. Confidence intervals for 
INFLATION spread in the negative region during the first two years of the shock, then 
distribute evenly around for the remaining periods. DEPOSITS have a negative effect 
with confidence intervals spreading around the central axis. TRADE has an initial 
positive effect with large confidence bans for the first two periods. Then the effect 
becomes slightly negative with smaller confidence bands and continues until the effect 
dies out in the long run. Finally, Granger Causality (table 3.C) indicates no significant 
causal relationship between DEPOSITS and DRGDP. The P-values of the relation in 
both directions are greater than 0.05. However, a significant supply leading relation runs 
from INFLATION to DRGDP with a significant P-value of 0.009, and from TRADE to 
DGRDP with a significant P-value of 0.03. The folloing pages present tables for 
summary statistics of variables (table 3.A), and results of the KPSS test (table 3.B). A 
graphical representation of all series is presented in (figure 3.A). 
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TABLE 3.A – SUMMARY STATISTICS – MOROCCO 
 (45 observations) 
 RGDP DEPOSIT LIQ TRADE INF CAPOP GOVGDP OIL 
 Mean 4.60 0.71 0.27 0.49 0.05 2.94 0.16 3.01 
 Median 4.67 0.65 0.15 0.49 0.04 3.26 0.16 3.01 
 Maximum 4.88 0.95 0.92 0.62 0.16 3.59 0.22 4.28 
 Minimum 4.14 0.46 0.03 0.37 -0.01 1.62 0.12 2.05 
 Std. Dev. 0.24 0.14 0.27 0.07 0.04 0.57 0.03 0.64 
 Skewness -0.69 0.30 1.04 0.18 0.75 -0.92 0.33 0.23 
 Kurtosis 2.05 1.68 2.77 2.08 3.24 2.29 2.17 2.00 
* PRIV is not defined for Morocco due to lack of data. 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.B – UNIT ROOT TESTS - MOROCCO 
 Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test  
 Intercept  Trend and Intercept 
 LM-statistics LM-statistics 
 1% 0.739 1% 0.216 
 5% 0.463 5% 0.146 
 10% 0.347 10% 0.119  
Morocco (42 Obs.)   Whether Unit Root process 
RGDP  ** 0.783395  ** 0.193047 I(1)  - difference  
INFL  ** 0.177179  ** 0.177212 I(0) at 5% intercept 
CAPOP  ** 0.683241  ** 0.202593 I(1)  - difference  
LNOIL       0.305876  ** 0.159404 I(0) at 5% intercept 
LIQ         0.765441   ** 0.223839 I(1)  - difference  
Significance level at the 5% level (**)  
 
 
 
TABLE 3.C – GRANGER CAUSALITY – MOROCCO 
Granger Causality for Financial Development Variables   
Hypothesis  Chi- Squared Probability  Nature of Causality  (No Causality) 
DEPOSIT Causes DRGDP 5.38 0.07 Fail to reject hypothesis  
DRGDP Does not Cause DEPOSIT 4.47 0.11 Fail to reject hypothesis  
Granger Causality for Non Financial Development Variables  
Hypothesis Chi- Squared Probability  Nature of Causality 
INFLATION causes DRGDP  9.347845 0.0093 Reject hypothesis 
DRGDP does not cause 
INFLATION 0.634419 0.7282 Fail to reject hypothesis 
TRADE causes DRGDP  6.585733 0.0371 Reject hypothesis 
DRGDP does not cause TRADE 3.123868 0.2097 Fail to reject hypothesis 
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FIGURE 3.B – IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS - MOROCCO 
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EGYPT 
A large proportion of Egyptian resources were devoted to preparing the country 
for warfare with Israel on 1967 and 1973 and later to rebuilding after the destruction 
incurred in the Arab-Israeli wars. This explains the rise in GDP and government 
expenditures series during that period.  Egypt suffered inflation and heavy losses from 
supporting the republican government in Yemen between 1962 and 1967. A process of 
privatization that began in the mid-1990s and moved substantial public sector assets into 
private sector hands has slowed since the year 2000. The Egyptian economy relies 
heavily on tourism, oil and gas, and Suez Canal revenues, all of which are vulnerable to 
surrounding regional events (The U.S. Department of State, 2005). 
Descriptive statistics cover the time frame of 1960 – 2003. Median Statistics 
show that deposits constitute 59% of total assets, while liquid liabilities and private 
credit compose a median proportion of 2.1 and 0.29 of GDP.  Skewness statistics 
indicate that RGDP (-0.34), LIQUIDITY (-0.13), and CAPOP (-0.42) are skewed right 
with a large left tail indicate by the low Kurtosis values. All other variables are skewed 
left, with a long positive right tail. LIQUIDITY is the only variables with a high standard 
deviation of 0.89, relative other variable’s standard deviations. The KPSS test results 
with a trend indicate that the LM-statistics on PRIVATE (0.143) and LIQUIDITY 
(0.110) fail to reject the null hypothesis that the variable is stationary at the 5% 
significance level of 0.146. LM-statistics on INFLATION (0.27) and LNOIL (0.3) also 
fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level of 0.463 when modeled with 
a constant. CAPOP and RGDP reject stationarity when modeled with an intercept and 
trend, and are, thereafter, differenced. I exclude the trend component from the regression 
because I difference two variables.   
e)2(DCAPOP13.0)1(DCAPOP04.0
)1(INFLATION59.0)1(TRADE12.0017.0DRGDP
+−+−+
−−−+−=
   [4.A] 
eDEPOSITSLIQUIDITY
DCAPOPDCAPOPTRADEDRGDP
++−
−+−+−−−=
22.0049.0
)2(12.0)1(03.0)1(164.0145.0
 [4.B] 
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The coefficient on the difference in capital per capita in the first OLS estimation 
equation [4.A] is +0.04 and significant, and so is the first lag on TRADE +0.12, 
indicating a positive and significant effect on the growth in RGDP. In the same equation 
INFLATION has a negative and significant coefficient with a P-value of 0.03. After 
adding financial development variables, INFLATION drops out as insignificant, while 
DEPOSITS and LIQUIDITY enter with significant P-values of 0.06 and 0.02 in equation 
[4.B]. None of the institutional quality indices provide evidence of significance. 
Therefore, equation [4.B] provides evidence of the most significant variables that are 
worth estimating in a VAR system. Impulse response functions indicate that all three 
variables: TRADE, DCAPOP, and DEPOSITS have a significant positive effect on the 
growth of RGDP. The effect of DEPOSITS and TRADE rise gradually during the first 
four years with wide confidence bands in the positive significance region. The effect of 
DEPOSITS shrinks moderately on the fifth year then approaches zero but remains 
positive and significant until the last graphed period. The effect of TRADE approaches 
zero in the long run. Growth in capital per capita has a large initial positive effect on the 
growth of RGDP during the first four years, with broad confidence bands, and then 
declines steadily until it becomes negative in the long run (figure 4.B).  LIQUIDITY, 
however, has an initial positive and insignificant which becomes negative and more 
significant in the long run. Granger Causality (table 4.C) suggests that financial 
institutions contribute to economic development through a “supply-leading” causal 
relation between DEPOSITS and the growth of RGDP, and “bidirectional” causality 
between LIQUIDITY and RGDP.   Inverse causality does prove statistically significant 
for DEPOSITS because Chi-Squared values are not large enough.  The folloing pages 
present tables for summary statistics of variables (table 4.A), and results of the KPSS 
test (table 4.B). A graphical representation of all series is presented in (figure 4.A). 
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FIGURE 4.A - VARIABLES - EGYPT (1960 – 2003) 
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TABLE 4.A – SUMMARY STATISTICS – EGYPT 
 (45 observations) 
 RGDP DEPOSIT LIQ PRIVATE TRADE INF CAPOP GOVGDP LNOIL 
 Mean 3.49 0.59 1.52 0.34 0.46 0.04 1.89 0.17 3.01 
 Median 3.66 0.59 2.10 0.29 0.45 0.04 2.02 0.16 3.01 
 Maximum 3.97 0.77 2.64 0.66 0.74 0.09 2.60 0.28 4.28 
 Minimum 2.91 0.44 0.50 0.20 0.30 -0.01 0.83 0.10 2.05 
 Std. Dev. 0.33 0.08 0.89 0.13 0.11 0.03 0.57 0.05 0.64 
 Skewness -0.34 0.28 -0.13 1.14 0.64 0.20 -0.42 0.51 0.23 
 Kurtosis 1.56 2.56 1.10 3.25 2.75 1.96 1.67 2.11 2.00 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.B – UNIT ROOT TESTS - EGYPT 
 Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test  
 Intercept  Trend and Intercept  
 LM-statistics LM-statistics  
    1%        0.739 1%       0.216  
 5% 0.463 5% 0.146  
  10% 0.347 10% 0.119   
Egypt (42 Obs.)   Whether Unit Root process 
RGDP  *** 0.79916  * 0.130025 I(1) - difference 
INFL  0.278357   I(0) at 5% Intercept 
CAPOP  ** 0.571294  ** 0.155374 
I(1) at 5%, I(0) @1%   
       - Difference -  
LNOIL  0.305876  ** 0.159404 I(0) at 5% Intercept 
LIQ  *** 0.749586  0.110384 I(0) at 5% trend 
PRIVATE   ** 0.694023   * 0.143304 I(0) at 5% trend 
Significant at the 1% level (***), at the 10% level (**) , at the 5% (*)  
 
 
 
TABLE 4.C – GRANGER CAUSALITY – EGYPT 
Granger Causality for Financial Development Variables  
Hypothesis  Chi-Squared Probability 
Nature of Causality   
(Supply-leading and Bidirectional causality) 
DEPOSIT does not cause DRGDP 9.898 0.007 Reject hypothesis (Supply-leading causality) 
DRGDP does not cause DEPOSITS 3.663 0.160 Fail to reject hypothesis 
LIQUIDITY does not cause DRGDP 7.599 0.022 Reject hypothesis (Bidirectional causality) 
DRGDP does not cause LIQUIDITY 9.211 0.010 Reject hypothesis (Bidirectional causality) 
Granger Causality for Non Financial Development Variables 
DCAPOP does not cause DRGDP  9.737 0.008 Reject hypothesis 
DRGDP does not cause DCAPOP 3.389 0.184 Fail to reject hypothesis 
TRADE does not cause DRGDP  6.869 0.032 Reject hypothesis 
DRGDP does not cause TRADE 1.826 0.401 Fail to reject hypothesis 
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FIGURE 4.B – IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS - EGYPT 
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ALGERIA 
Graphs for Algeria show inflation and a major slowdown in the country’s 
economic activities between 1990 and 1999 in response to a civil war during that period. 
The fall in oil and natural gas prices also seems to reflect a dip in the openness to trade 
graph as natural gas composes a substantial portion of Algerian exports. We also realize 
this feature when looking at the TRADE series of Saudi Arabia. The country is studied 
in the time frame of 1970-2003. Summary statistics indicate that deposits compose a 
median of 82% of total assets. Liquid liabilities and private credit correspondingly 
comprise a median proportion of 0.89 and 0.57 to RGDP. All variables except 
PRIVATE and INFLATION are skewed right as indicate by the negative Skewness 
values. Distributions are flat for all three financial development variables as indicate by 
the low Kurtosis statistics. LNOIL has the highest standard deviation among all variables 
reflected by the embargo during 1970’s and oil price during 1980’s. All variables fail to 
reject stationarity because LM-statistic is less than the 5% significance level of 0.463 
when modeled with an intercept and 0.146 when modeled with a trend.  
e)1(CAPOP58.0LNOIL16.0)2(RGDP38.0)1(RGDP16.0TREND03.06RGDP +−++−−−−+=  [5.A] 
e)1(DEPOSITS54.0)1(LIQUIDITY21.0
)1(CAPOP41.0LNOIL12.0)1(RGDP29.0TREND03.09.4RGDP
+−+−+
−++−−+=    [5.B] 
eerlgA_CL027.0
)1(DEPOSITS72.0)1(LIQUIDITY3.0)1(CAPOP42.0TREND03.09.2RGDP
++
−+−+−++=  [5.C] 
Similar to the preceding analysis I continue the exercise of estimating an initial OLS 
regression of the RGDP on the six control variables. I reduce the estimation to a system 
of the most significant variables (equation 5.A), add financial development variables 
(equation 5.B), then including institutional indices. Equation 5.C states that the first lag 
on DEPOSTIS, LIQUIDITY, capital per capita, and the index of civil liberties have a 
significant positive effect on RGDP, with significant P-values at the 5% level. The 
positive sign on civil liberties index indicates that lower freedom of civilians has a 
significant positive effect on RGDP, because higher numbers on the index denote less 
freedom. R-squared has a fairly high explanatory power of 93%. 
    
 
33
  Impulse response functions (figure 5.B) show an initial significant positive effect 
of DEPOSITS on RGDP with wide positive confidence bands, it dies out to zero, and 
becomes slightly negative in the long run. LIQUIDITY also has an initial positive effect, 
but its confidence bands are narrower than those for DEPOSITS. The effect dies out in 
the fifth period and becomes insignificantly negative in the long run. CAPOP has a 
highly significant initial positive effect, it declines when approaching the fifth period, 
turns into a negative effect with wide confidence intervals between the fifth and seventh 
period, and finally becomes insignificantly positive in the log run. Granger causality 
(table 5.C) suggests that financial development and economic growth have significant 
bidirectional causality in Algeria, if LIQUIDITY is used to proxy financial development. 
When DEPOSITS is used to proxy financial development causality goes in one 
direction, indicating that financial development exist after real growth had fully takes 
place “demand – following” phenomenon . The folloing pages present tables for 
summary statistics of variables (table 5.A), and results of the KPSS test (table 5.B). A 
graphical representation of all series of Algeria is presented in (figure 5.A). 
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FIGURE 5.A - VARIABLES - ALGERIA (1970-2003) 
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TABLE 5.A – SUMMARY STATISTICS - ALGERIA 
 (34 observations) 
 RGDP DEPOSIT LIQ PRIVATE TRAD INFL CAPOP GOVGDP LNOIL 
 Mean 6.81 0.82 0.87 0.56 0.55 0.10 5.71 0.16 2.63 
 Median 6.89 0.82 0.89 0.57 0.54 0.08 5.74 0.16 2.82 
 Maximum 7.30 0.98 1.23 0.91 0.77 0.28 6.09 0.19 3.53 
 Minimum 6.03 0.65 0.54 0.27 0.27 0.00 5.02 0.11 0.30 
 Std. Dev. 0.31 0.10 0.18 0.19 0.11 0.07 0.27 0.02 0.85 
 Skewness -1.18 -0.11 -0.06 0.13 -0.37 1.03 -1.04 -0.31 -1.61 
 Kurtosis 4.20 1.90 2.10 1.83 2.97 3.14 3.74 2.49 4.79 
 
 
TABLE 5.B – UNIT ROOT TESTS - ALGERIA 
 Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test   
 Intercept  Trend and Intercept  
 LM-statistics LM-statistics  
 1% 0.739 1% 0.216  
 5% 0.463 5% 0.146  
 10% 0.347 10% 0.119  
Algeria (32 Obs.)     
RGDP   ** 0.6412  * 0.1254 I(0) at 5% trend 
INFL  0.126  0.108894 I(0) at 5% Intercept 
CAPOP  0.169781  0.108123 I(0) at 5% Intercept 
LNOIL  0.163037  **0.142791 I(0) at 5% Intercept 
LIQ  0.292531  0.113345 I(0) at 5% Intercept 
PRIVATE  0.343878  ** 0.170716 I(0) at 5% Intercept 
Significant at the 5% level (**), at the 10% level (*) 
 
 
TABLE 5.C – GRANGER CAUSALITY – ALGERIA 
Granger Causality for Financial Development Variables   
Hypothesis  
Chi-  
Squared Probability 
Nature of Causality  
 (Bi-directional & Unidirectional ) 
DEPOSIT does not cause RGDP 12.478 0.002 
Reject hypothesis  
(demand following causality) 
LIQUIDITY does not cause RGDP  10.784 0.005 Reject hypothesis  
RGDP does not cause DEPOSIT 0.435 0.804 Fail to reject hypothesis 
RGDP does not cause  LIQUIDITY  57.434 0.000 
Reject hypothesis  
(Bidirectional causality) 
Granger Causality for Non Financial Development Variables 
CAPOP cause RGDP 10.677 0.005 Reject hypothesis  
RGDP does not cause CAPOP 0.080 0.961 Fail to reject hypothesis 
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FIGURE 5.B – IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS – ALGERIA 
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JORDAN 
The Jordanian economy shows stable growth from the years 1977 till 1988. As 
Jordan supported Iraq during its war with Iran it reaped sizable economic benefits from 
its standpoint. In addition, the economic sector witnessed significant progress during the 
late 1970’s and early 1980’s as Arab funding supports and transfer by immigrates 
increased substantially during the period of high oil prices. However, the country 
experienced a large devaluation in its currency in the late 1980’s leading it to a serious 
economic crisis that was worsened by the 1990 gulf war. After signing the 1994 peace 
treaty with Israel, the Kingdom initiated steady measures of reform which explain lower 
volatility in the graphs as they approach 2003. I analyze the time frame of 1977-2003. 
Summary statistics indicate that deposits compose a median of 76% of total assets. 
Liquid liabilities and private credit, respectively, comprise a median proportion of 1.89 
and 0.99 to RGDP. Skewness statistics indicate that the observations on LIQUIDITY (+ 
0.1) and DEPOSITS (+0.03) are skewed left with a long positive right tail and flat 
distributions. PRIVATE (-1.07) is skewed right, with a peaked distribution indicate by a 
3.13 kurtosis.   
All variables fail to reject stationarity because LM-statistic is less than the 5% 
significance level of 0.463 when modeled with an intercept and 0.146 when modeled 
with a trend. PRIVATE strongly rejects a unit root when modeled with an intercept 
using the Augmented-Dickey Fuller test. t-statistics is -3.147 larger than the 5% 
significance value of -2.96. I continue the exercise of estimating an initial OLS 
regression of the RGDP on the six control variables then reduce the estimation to a 
system of the most significant variables (equation 6.A), add financial development 
variables. Equation 6.B represents the final OLS model since none of the institutional 
indices prove significant.  It states that the first lag on RGDP, TRADE, and DEPOSOTS 
have a significant positive effect in explaining RGDP, with cumulative coefficients of 
0.49, 1.33, and 0.16 respectively. R-squared has a fairly high explanatory power of 95%. 
eLNOIL149.0)2(TRADE317.0)1(TRADE4.0TREND0004.071.0RGDP ++−+−−−=  [6.A] 
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e)2(DEPOSITS96.0)1(DEPOSITS37.0)1(RGDP49.0
)2(TRADE25.0)1(TRADE09.0TREND007.023.0RGDP
+−+−+−+
−+−−−=
  [6.B] 
Impulse response functions (figure 6.B) show an initial significant positive effect 
of DEPOSITS on RGDP with narrow positive confidence bands at first. The effect 
becomes larger with wider confidence intervals from the second to the ninth period, and 
then becomes insignificantly negative with wide confidence bands in the long run.  
TRADE has a slightly negative effect during the fist two periods; it becomes positive 
and significant with wide confidence bands for seven periods and dies out towards then 
of the last graphed period. Granger causality (table 6.C) suggests that DEPOSITS, as a 
proxy for financial development, has a significant unidirectional causal relation with 
economic growth in a “supply-leading” form. TRADE also proves to have a high value 
for the Chi-squared statistics, indicating that it causes RGDP. The folloing pages present 
tables for summary statistics of variables (table 6.A), and results of the KPSS test (table 
6.B). A graphical representation of all series is presented in (figure 6.A). 
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FIGURE 6.A - VARIABLES – JORDAN (1977– 2003) 
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TABLE 6.A – SUMMARY STATISTICS - JORDAN 
 (26 observations) 
 RGDP DEPOSIT LIQ PRIVATE TRAD INF CAPOP GOVGDP LNOIL 
 Mean 2.62 0.76 1.87 0.94 1.20 0.06 1.35 0.26 2.96 
 Median 2.55 0.76 1.89 0.99 1.19 0.04 1.33 0.25 2.89 
 Maximum 2.86 0.85 2.59 1.14 1.49 0.23 2.03 0.34 3.53 
 Minimum 2.42 0.67 1.14 0.49 0.82 0.00 0.89 0.22 2.31 
 Std. Dev. 0.15 0.05 0.40 0.18 0.15 0.05 0.31 0.03 0.35 
 Skewness 0.46 0.03 0.10 -1.07 -0.38 1.45 0.30 1.06 0.08 
 Kurtosis 1.58 2.32 2.28 3.13 3.38 4.93 2.36 3.84 1.94 
 
 
 
TABLE 6.B – UNIT ROOT TESTS - JORDAN 
 Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test   
 Intercept  Trend and Intercept  
 LM-statistics LM-statistics  
 1% 0.739 1% 0.216  
 5% 0.463 5% 0.146  
 10% 0.347 10% 0.119  
Jordan (24 Obs. )     
RGDP  ** 0.468481  0.100176 I(0) at 5% trend 
INFL  0.315225  0.062185 I(0) at 5% intercept 
CAPOP  ** 0.555253  0.059828 I(0) at 5% trend 
LNOIL  ** 0.602848  0.106874 I(0) at 5% trend 
LIQ  0.289706  0.185005 I(0) at 5% intercept 
PRIVATE   ** 0.648444   0.166513 I(0) at 5% ADF test 
Significant at the 5% level (**) 
 
 
 
TABLE 6.C – GRANGER CAUSALITY - JORDAN 
Granger Causality for Financial Development Variables   
Hypothesis  Chi-Squared Probability Nature of Causality (Unidirectional) 
DEPOSIT does not cause RGDP 21.051 0.000 
Reject hypothesis 
(supply leading causality) 
RGDP does not cause DEPOSIT 0.760 0.392 Fail to reject hypothesis  
Granger Causality for Non Financial Development Variables 
TRADE does not cause RGDP  12.860 0.0016 Reject hypothesis  
RGDP does not cause TRADE 1.719 0.423 Fail to reject hypothesis 
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FIGURE 6.B – IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS - JORDAN 
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BAHRAIN  
The graphs on real GDP, government expenditure, and capital per capita of 
Bahrain show a sharp jump on 1986. This can be explained by the three month Qatari 
occupation of a piece of Bahraini territory causing a short upheaval that was later 
conciliated by Saudi Arabia. Bahrain is dependent on Saudi Arabia for oil since a large 
share of its exports consists of petroleum products made from refining imported crude. 
Therefore, we note an inflationary phase during the late 1970’s, similar to that of Saudi 
Arabia, after assisting in Arab oil embargo. We notice a rise in GDP along with a drop in 
liquid liability’s share of GDP in 1990. This might be explained by Bahrain’s 
participation in the coalition "Operation Desert Storm" against Iraq (the Gulf War).  
The country is studied in the time frame of 1975-2003. The variables DEPOSITS 
is not constructed due to lack of sufficient data. Summary statistics indicate that liquid 
liabilities and private credit, respectively, comprise a median proportion of 0.61 and 0.46 
to RGDP. Skewness statistics indicate that all variables but LIQUIDITY and GOVGDP 
are skewed left with a long positive right tail.  All variables have flat distributions (low 
Kurtosis values) except RGDP and INFLATION. All variables fail to reject stationarity 
because the LM-statistic is less than the 5% significance level of 0.463 when modeled 
with an intercept and 0.146 when modeled with a trend. Moreover, PRIVATE strongly 
rejects a unit root when modeled with an intercept and trend using the Augmented-
Dickey Fuller test. It has a t-statistics of 3.79 larger than the 5% significance value of -
3.56. INFLATION also rejects a unit root when modeled with an intercept using the 
Augmented-Dickey Fuller test. It has a t-statistics of -3.453 larger than the 5% 
significance value of -2.96. 
e)1(GOVGDP23.2TREND006.098.3RGDP +−−+=     [7.A] 
I estimate an initial OLS regression (for OLS results see Excel file) of the RGDP 
on the six control variables, reduce the estimation to a system of the most significant 
variables, add two financial development variables, and finally add institutional indices. 
Equation 7.A represents the final OLS model since neither financial development 
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variables nor the institutional indices proved significant.  Equation 7.A states that the 
first lag on the share of government spending from GDP has a significant negative effect 
in explaining RGDP, with a P-value of 0.0041. R-squared has an explanatory power of 
63%. Impulse responses show a significant negative and persistent effect of GOVGDP 
on RGDP with wide confidence bands falling mostly in the negative region. Granger 
Causality (table 7.C) indicates a significant causal relation running from GOVGDP to 
RGDP with a Chi-Squared of 6.14. The folloing pages present tables for summary 
statistics of variables (table 7.A), and results of the KPSS test (table 7.B). A graphical 
representation of all series for Bahrain is presented in (figure 7.A), and the impulse 
resposes of a VAR estimation (figure 7.B) shows the effect of RGDP and GOVGDP to a 
shock of each. 
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FIGURE 7.A - VARIABLES - BAHRAIN (1975 – 2003) 
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TABLE 7.A – SUMMARY STATISTICS - BAHRAIN 
(28 observations) 
 RGDP LIQ PRIV TRAD INF CAPOP GOVGDP LNOIL 
 Mean 3.62 0.61 0.46 1.83 0.04 2.27 0.20 3.37 
 Median 3.63 0.64 0.42 1.82 0.01 2.09 0.20 3.20 
 Maximum 3.79 0.86 0.62 2.52 0.20 2.95 0.27 4.28 
 Minimum 3.36 0.39 0.28 1.28 -0.03 1.51 0.13 2.60 
 Std. Dev. 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.33 0.06 0.46 0.04 0.46 
 Skewness -0.63 -0.11 0.17 0.42 1.45 0.16 -0.09 0.52 
 Kurtosis 3.72 1.90 1.48 2.36 3.89 1.57 1.99 2.23 
*DEPOSITS is not defined for Bahrain due to lack of data.  
 
 
 
TABLE 7.B – UNIT ROOT TESTS - BAHRAIN 
 Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test   
 Intercept  Trend and Intercept  
 LM-statistics LM-statistics  
 1% 0.739 1% 0.216  
 5% 0.463 5% 0.146  
 10% 0.347 10% 0.119  
Bahrain (26 Obs.)    
RGDP  0.14313  * 0.142439 I(0) at 5% intercept 
INFL  ** 0.463417  ** 0.176468 I(0) at 1% ADF intercept 
CAPOP  ** 0.575909  0.100306 I(0) at 5% trend 
LNOIL  ** 0.516933  0.08461 I(0) at 5% trend 
LIQ  ** 0.563684  0.098958 I(0) at 5% trend 
PRIVATE   ** 0.558536   ** 0.146096 I(0) at 1% ADF trend 
Significant at the 10% level (*) , at the 5% level (**) 
 
 
 
TABLE 7.C – GRANGER CAUSALITY - BAHRAIN 
Granger Causality for Non Financial Development Variables  
Hypothesis  Chi- Squared Probability Nature of Causality 
GOVGDP causes RGDP  6.145 0.0463 Reject hypothesis 
RGDP does not causes GOVGDP  3.612 0.164 Fail to reject hypothesis 
 
 
 
 
    
 
46
FIGURE 7.B – IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS – BAHRAIN 
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CHAPTER IV  
CONCLUSIONS  
Subject to the caveat that proxies may or may not detect the impact of financial 
development on economic growth, I assume that the three proxies used for financial 
development are positively correlated with financial development, and real GDP per 
capita is positively correlated with economic growth. Granger Causality results indicate 
a causal relationship between proxies for financial development and economic growth in 
four countries out of seven, namely Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Algeria. In the 
cases of Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Algeria and Syria DEPOSITS appears as the 
significant proxy for financial development from the third Ordinary Least Squared 
estimation. Evidence indicates unidirectional causality, specifically “Supply – Leading 
causality”, running from financial development to economic growth in both Egypt and 
Jordan. Note that real GDP per capita is used as a proxy for economic growth for all 
countries except Egypt and Morocco, where the variable is differenced and interpreted as 
the growth in real GDP per capita. In the cases of Syria and Morocco no causal 
relationship comes into view. Algeria shows evidence of unidirectional causality, 
specifically “Demand – Following causality”, running from economic growth to 
financial development for the proxy DEPOSITS. Bidirectional Causality running in both 
directions comes into view in three countries, namely Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. 
Both Algeria and Egypt reveal bidirectional causality through the variable LIQUIDITY, 
while Saudi Arabia does so through the variable PRIVATE. Although Egypt and Algeria 
show evidence of bidirectional causality through LIQUIDITY, unidirectional causality 
runs in opposite directions for each country. Egypt reveal evidence of “Supply- Leading 
Causality” running from the variable DEPOSITS to growth of real GDP per capita, 
While Algeria reveals evidence of “Demand-Following Causality” running from 
LIQUIDITY to real GDP per capita. Ordinary Least Squared results confirm the 
significance of civil liberties index in both Saudi Arabia and Algeria. The index of 
political freedom proves significant only in the case of Syria. Bahrain shows no 
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significant effect of any of the financial development proxy variables on economic 
development. However, the share of government expenditure from GDP shows a 
significant negative cause of economic growth in the case of Bahrain, running in one 
direction, and the case of Syria, running in two directions. Openness to trade shows a 
significant positive causal effect on growth of real GDP per capita indicating “Supply-
Leading causality” for both Egypt and Morocco. Capital per capita shows evidence of a 
unidirectional Demand-Following causal effect on real GDP per capita in Algeria. The 
growth of Capital per Capita appears to have significant causal effect on the growth of 
real GDP per capita in Egypt. Table 8 presents a summary of concluding results.  
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TABLE 8 - SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
‡ Refers to Impulse Response Functions  
§ Refers to Financial Development 
** Refers to Granger Causality test 
†† Refers to Ordinary Least Squared estimations 
♣The dependent variable is the growth of real GDP per capita (DRGDP) rather than RGDP 
 
 VAR Results  Direction of effect 
from (IRF‡) 
  
Country Effect of 
F.D.§ 
variables 
Effect on  
non F.D.  
variables 
Type of 
causality 
(G.C.**Test)  
Initial Long 
 run 
Significance 
of 
confidence 
bands 
Institutional  
indices  
effect (OLS††) 
  
KSA Private   Bidirectional  Positive  Negative  Significant  Significant  
Civil Liberties 
Index  
 
Syria  Deposits  No causality  Positive  Negative  Insignificant 
  GOVGDP  Bidirectional  Negative  No effect  Significant 
Significant 
Political  
Freedom  
Index  
 
Morocco♣  Deposits   No causality  Negative No effect Insignificant 
 Inflation  Supply leading Negative No effect Significant  
 Trade  Supply leading Positive No effect Significant 
 
 
Egypt ♣ Deposits   Supply leading Positive Positive  Significant  
 Liquidity   Bidirectional Positive Negative Significant 
 DCAPOP Supply leading Positive Negative Significant  
 Trade  Supply leading Positive No effect Significant 
 
 
Algeria  Deposits  Demand following  Positive No effect Significant 
Liquidity   Bidirectional Positive No effect Significant  
 CAPOP Demand following  Positive Positive Significant 
Significant  
Civil 
 Liberties 
 Index 
 
Jordan  Deposits  Supply leading Positive No effect Significant 
  Trade Supply leading Positive No effect Significant 
 
 
Bahrain  GOVGDP Supply leading Negative Negative Significant  
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APPENDIX A 
 DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES 
The following are definitions of how each variable was obtained as suggested in Chapter 
two of Levine and Demirguc-kunt 2001. Note that the consumer price index (CPI) is 
used for converting a series to its real value rather than GDP deflator. The CPI includes 
goods that were actually bought by consumers and not good purchased only by the 
governments or firms. The CPI also assigns fixed weights while the GDP deflator 
assigns changing weights. Finally the CPI includes imported goods while the GDP 
deflator includes only domestic goods.  
 
Control Variables: 
1. The log of real GDP per capita (RGDP) is used as a proxy for the lead of economic 
development. Calculated as annual nominal GDP in local currency as specified by the 
IFS national accounts (line 99b), deflated by average annual CPI (line 64) and total 
population (line 99z). 
2. Government expenditure (GOVGDP) is calculated, as the ratio of government 
consumption as specified by the IFS national accounts (line 91f) deflated by annual 
nominal GDP (line99b).  
3. The inflation rate (INFLATION) is calculated using the difference in the log of 
average annual CPI.  
4.  Openness to trade (TRADE) is computed by dividing the sum of exports and imports 
of goods and services, as measures by IFS national accounts (line 90c, 98c), by nominal 
GDP (line 99b). 
5. Data on annual oil prices (OIL) is obtained from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration’s official website for energy statistics (www.eia.doe.gov), quoted as 
Saudi Arabian light crude by OPEC from 1950 to 2003. 
6. Capital per capita (CAPOP) is measured by the log of the ratio of the capital stock, 
obtained as the sum of gross fixed capital formation (line 93e) and change in inventory 
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(line 93i) as specified by IFS national accounts,  deflated by annual CPI and population. 
Note that the series on changes in inventory starts on 1965 for Egypt. Thus, capital is 
computed as only gross fixed capital formation before 1965, and the summation of both 
thereafter. For Syria CAPOP is calculated as gross fixed capital formations (line 93) 
since no other statistics on capital are reported. 
 
Financial Development Variables:  
IFS distinguish among three groups of financial institutions: central banks, deposit 
money banks, and other financial institutions. The first group consists of the central bank 
and other institutions that perform functions of the monetary authorities. The second 
group consists of all financial institutions that have liabilities in the form of deposits 
usable in making payments (IMF 1984, 29). The third group consists of bank-like 
institutions and non-bank financial institutions that serve as financial intermediaries but 
do not incur liabilities usable as forms of payments. 
7. Private Credit (PRIVATE) is used as a proxy for measuring the activity of financial 
intermediaries. It is calculated as the ratio of deflated private sector credit to real GDP. 
Private sector credit (denoted F.D. in the formula below) is calculated as the claims of 
deposit money banks on private sector (line 22d). Deposit money bank claims on other 
bank-like institutions (lines 22 f), and other banking institutions claims on private sector 
(line 42d) are added to FD when available.  
PRIVATE = 
ta
t
te
t
te
t
CPI
GDP
CPI
DF
CPI
DF
,
1,
1
,
)....(*5.0
−
−+
 
Here the subscript e  indicates the value of CPI measured on the fourth quarter of the 
previous year, and a  indicates the average value of CPI over the current year .t  (Beck, 
Levine, and Loayza 1999). 
 
The variable PRIVATE is not constructed for Morocco because of a break in the series 
on deposit money banks claims on the private sector. Figures are collected as zero for 
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the years 1986 till 1989. The series contain two breaks that identify a point at which 
multiple time series versions were linked on 1982 and 1990 respectively, and a third 
break on 1997 due to a change in analytical comparability of data (IFS Online). For 
Saudi Arabia,  PRIVATE is calculated as the ratio of the sum of deposit money bank 
claims on private sector (credit22d), non-financial public enterprises (line22c), and 
claims on privates sector by other financial institutions (line 42d). For Jordan PRIVATE 
includes private claims on deposit money banks (line 22d) and other banking institutions 
(line 42d). 
 
8. Liquid Liabilities to GDP, LIQ,  is measured by dividing the two year arithmetic 
average of M2 series (currency plus demand deposits and interest bearing deposits – line 
35l) deflated by end of year CPI by GDP (line 99b) after deflating it by the average CPI 
for that year. The variable LIQ for Morocco is divided by 100 for scaling purposes. For 
Saudi Arabia the series of GDP and M2 are divided by 100,000 before being deflated by 
CPI. The ratio, thereafter, is also divided by 1000 to scale the variable. Data on the CPI 
for Algeria is available on a quarterly basis from 1979 -2000 and on an annual basis 
from 1969 till 1976. Also the CPI for Bahrain is available on a quarterly basis from 1966 
- 2000 and on an annual basis from 1966 till 2002. As a result, I use a different formula 
when calculating the series of liquid liabilities depending on the years considered. 
Calculations are made according to the following formulas:  
For the year’s 1969 till1976:     For the years 1976 till 2000: 
ta
t
ta
t
ta
t
CPI
GDP
CPI
FD
CPI
FD
,
1,
1
,
)(*5.0
−
−+
   
ta
t
te
t
te
t
CPI
GDP
CPI
FD
CPI
FD
,
1,
1
,
)(*5.0
−
−+
 
Here the subscript e  indicates the value of the CPI measured on the fourth quarter of the 
previous year, and a  indicates the average value of CPI over the current year .t  
 
9. The variable DEPOSIT is calculated by dividing deposit money bank assets by total 
financial assets. Total financial assets (Columns A+B+C)are measured as the sum of 
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central bank assets (lines 12 a, d, c, f, and bx), deposit money bank assets (lines 22 a, c, 
d, and f), and claims of other banking institutions on private sector and The table below 
illustrates how DEPOSIT was calculated for each country.   
 Total Deposit Money 
 Bank Assets 
(Column A) 
Total Central 
Bank Assets 
(Column B) 
Total Other Banking 
Institutions Assets 
(Column C) 
Jordan Lines 22 a + d Line 12 a Line 42 d 
Egypt Lines 22 a + d + c + f Line 12 a + c Lines 42 a + d 
Algeria Lines 22 a + d + c Line 12 a NA 
Morocco  Lines 22 a + d + f Lines 12 a +d + e NA 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Lines 22 a + d + c NA Line 42 d 
Syria Lines 22 a + d + bx Lines 12 a + bx NA 
Bahrain  Variable not constructed due to missing figures on columns B and C from 
1975 -1991 
 
A. Total Deposit Money Bank Assets (line 22) include: claims on private sector 
(category d), claims on non-profit public enterprises (category c), claims on official 
entities (category bx), and claims on central Government (category a). 
 B. Total Central Bank Assets (line 12) include: claims on central government (category 
a), and claims on deposit money banks (category e), claims on non-financial public 
enterprises (category c), claims on private sector (category d), and claims on official 
entities (category bx).  
C. Total Other Banking Institutions Assets (line 42) includes: claims on non-financial 
public enterprises (category c) and claims on private sector (category d). 
 
Notes:  
(1) Data had not been collected on column C for Algeria, Syria and Morocco.   
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(2) Statistics on line 22c for Algeria are missing prior to 1992; thus Column A for the 
years 1964 - 1992 is (3) calculated by adding lines 22a and d.  
(4) Lines 22f and 22d for Morocco contain breaks in the sense that observations are 
collected as zero for the years 1986 till 1989. Figures for line22a also contain a break on 
1990 due to multiple time series versions linked by splicing.  
(5) Note that lines 42 for Morocco used to be collected at IFS starting 1997. Therefore, I 
use line 22f to supplement the construction of total assets for Morocco. However, figures 
are first reported starting 1982. 
 
Indices: 
10. Indices of Political Freedom (PL) and Civil Liberties (CL), collected by Freedom 
House from 1972 – 2003. Data may be accesses on line through 
(www.freedomhouse.org).  Political rights and civil liberties are measured on a one-to-
seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest. 
Countries whose combined average ratings for both indices are between 1.0 and 2.5 were 
considered "free"; between 3.0 and 5.5 “partly free,” and between 5.5 and 7.0 “not free.” 
 
11. Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFW), collected by The Fraser Institute 
from 1970 to 2000 on a five year bases, and annually thereafter. Data may be accesses 
online through (www.freetheworld.com). I construct a simple linear regression of EFW 
on the former two indices in an attempt to forecast observations in between the five 
years when no surveys were conducted. Note the index had not been constructed for 
Saudi Arabia, I therefore do not consider its effect for that country. Also only the index 
of political freedom is used to forecast EFW values for Syria. Since the value of the 
index on civil liberties happened to remain constant at seven for all the years except 
1976 to1979, the regression treats it as a constant because EFW has no values during 
those four years. The table below shows the equations estimated for that purpose by 
country. 
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Dependent Variable  Coefficients on Independent Variables 
EFW  Constant 
PL 
Index CL Index 
Jordan  9.67 1.13 -1.88 
Egypt  1.48 -0.05 0.84 
Algeria  2.77 0.99 -0.83 
Morocco  0.54 1.10 -0.07 
Syria  1.99 0.39   
Bahrain 6.23 0.16 -0.04 
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APPENDIX B  
 VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION (VAR) ESTIMATES 
VAR estimates for Saudi Arabia: 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
 Included observations: 26 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
 RGDP PRIV 
RGDP(-1) 1.425678 -0.09203 
 -0.22173 -0.18837 
 [ 6.42984] [-0.48854] 
   
RGDP(-2) -0.99068 0.356777 
 -0.23665 -0.20105 
 [-4.18629] [ 1.77457] 
   
PRIV(-1) 0.620577 0.924728 
 -0.29583 -0.25133 
 [ 2.09776] [ 3.67940] 
   
PRIV(-2) -0.79165 -0.0076 
 -0.27381 -0.23262 
 [-2.89122] [-0.03269] 
   
C 3.906565 -2.01083 
 -0.76076 -0.64632 
 [ 5.13507] [-3.11122] 
   
CL_KSA -0.08334 0.087434 
 -0.0496 -0.04214 
 [-1.68018] [ 2.07476] 
   
 R-squared 0.901159 0.950395 
 S.E. equation 0.087644 0.07446 
 Log likelihood 30.81206 35.21383 
VAR System Statistics  
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 1.44E-05 
 Log likelihood  80.71012 
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VAR estimates for Syria: 
31 observations    
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
 RGDP GOVGDP DEPOSIT 
RGDP(-1) 0.704424 0.087357 0.024267 
 -0.17647 -0.03275 -0.11023 
 [ 3.99176] [ 2.66745] [ 0.22014] 
    
RGDP(-2) 0.14665 -0.033571 -0.13142 
 -0.21248 -0.03943 -0.13273 
 [ 0.69017] [-0.85135] [-0.99013] 
    
GOVGDP(-1) -1.054023 0.254016 -0.702501 
 -1.22553 -0.22743 -0.76554 
 [-0.86005] [ 1.11687] [-0.91765] 
    
GOVGDP(-2) -2.820725 0.265699 -0.178216 
 -0.7964 -0.1478 -0.49748 
 [-3.54183] [ 1.79774] [-0.35824] 
    
DEPOSIT(-1) 0.070624 -0.090518 0.441715 
 -0.36891 -0.06846 -0.23045 
 [ 0.19144] [-1.32215] [ 1.91679] 
    
DEPOSIT(-2) -0.132989 0.046052 0.010121 
 -0.32832 -0.06093 -0.20509 
 [-0.40506] [ 0.75582] [ 0.04935] 
    
Constant 1.850609 -0.346502 1.271046 
 -0.72873 -0.13524 -0.45521 
 [ 2.53950] [-2.56217] [ 2.79223] 
    
TREND -0.008498 -0.002194 -0.003072 
 -0.0043 -0.0008 -0.00268 
 [-1.97694] [-2.75030] [-1.14401] 
    
LNOIL 0.117453 0.018386 0.025339 
 -0.06021 -0.01117 -0.03761 
 [ 1.95079] [ 1.64554] [ 0.67375] 
    
PF_SYR -0.06522 0.016095 -0.040044 
 -0.04156 -0.00771 -0.02596 
 [-1.56917] [ 2.08664] [-1.54238] 
    
 R-squared 0.929019 0.931138 0.721053 
 Sum sq. resids 0.109344 0.003766 0.042666 
 Log likelihood 43.5452 95.75756 58.1322 
VAR System Statistics     
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 1.27E-09  
 Log likelihood  203.5963  
 Log likelihood  216.1564  
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VAR estimates for Morocco: 
42 observations     
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
 DRGDP TRADE INF DEPOSIT 
DRGDP(-1) -0.173947 0.382912 0.108175 -0.510858 
 -0.20109 -0.2309 -0.14368 -0.2517 
 [-0.86501] [ 1.65835] [ 0.75287] [-2.02960] 
     
DRGDP(-2) -0.12924 -0.074294 -0.019114 0.070559 
 -0.15068 -0.17301 -0.10766 -0.1886 
 [-0.85772] [-0.42941] [-0.17753] [ 0.37412] 
     
TRADE(-1) 0.480092 0.858662 0.151266 0.026693 
 -0.19372 -0.22243 -0.13842 -0.24248 
 [ 2.47826] [ 3.86029] [ 1.09283] [ 0.11009] 
     
TRADE(-2) -0.239676 -0.290117 -0.177289 0.557735 
 -0.2253 -0.25869 -0.16098 -0.282 
 [-1.06380] [-1.12147] [-1.10130] [ 1.97776] 
     
INF(-1) -0.632418 -0.241211 0.323723 0.163879 
 -0.28037 -0.32192 -0.20033 -0.35093 
 [-2.25569] [-0.74929] [ 1.61599] [ 0.46699] 
     
INF(-2) -0.128203 0.432124 0.397691 -1.21187 
 -0.33949 -0.38981 -0.24257 -0.42493 
 [-0.37763] [ 1.10856] [ 1.63949] [-2.85193] 
     
DEPOSIT(-1) -0.212629 0.22027 0.057287 0.72785 
 -0.13733 -0.15768 -0.09812 -0.17189 
 [-1.54831] [ 1.39691] [ 0.58382] [ 4.23435] 
     
DEPOSIT(-2) 0.018898 -0.103276 -0.082625 -0.067346 
 -0.12576 -0.1444 -0.08986 -0.15741 
 [ 0.15026] [-0.71519] [-0.91949] [-0.42783] 
     
Constant 0.080408 0.112709 0.042448 0.018392 
 -0.05841 -0.06707 -0.04174 -0.07312 
 [ 1.37652] [ 1.68041] [ 1.01702] [ 0.25155] 
     
 R-squared 0.356637 0.584326 0.478857 0.884811 
 S.E. equation 0.043146 0.049541 0.030828 0.054005 
 Log likelihood 77.48204 71.67726 91.60032 68.05383 
VAR System Statistics     
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 4.81E-12  
 Determinant resid covariance  1.83E-12  
 Log likelihood     329.1291   
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VAR estimates for Egypt: 
 
42 Observations      
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]    
 DRGDP TRADE DCAPOP LIQ DEPOSIT 
DRGDP(-1) -0.066789 0.264644 0.700841 0.831771 -0.232626 
 -0.19043 -0.31751 -0.72676 -0.30659 -0.18358 
 [-0.35072] [ 0.83351] [ 0.96434] [ 2.71294] [-1.26719] 
DRGDP(-2) -0.327585 0.249859 -1.094821 0.22904 -0.190725 
 -0.16718 -0.27874 -0.63802 -0.26916 -0.16116 
 [-1.95946] [ 0.89638] [-1.71596] [ 0.85094] [-1.18343] 
TRADE(-1) 0.250257 1.012519 0.479811 -0.10125 0.158052 
 -0.1108 -0.18474 -0.42285 -0.17839 -0.10681 
 [ 2.25865] [ 5.48089] [ 1.13470] [-0.56759] [ 1.47974] 
TRADE(-2) -0.044373 -0.376595 -0.532645 0.047983 0.007775 
 -0.10759 -0.17938 -0.4106 -0.17322 -0.10371 
 [-0.41243] [-2.09940] [-1.29725] [ 0.27701] [ 0.07497] 
DCAPOP(-1) 0.01653 -0.109748 0.000288 -0.013453 -0.066775 
 -0.04386 -0.07312 -0.16737 -0.07061 -0.04228 
 [ 0.37692] [-1.50090] [ 0.00172] [-0.19052] [-1.57945] 
DCAPOP(-2) 0.13778 0.01641 0.379099 -0.150613 0.012666 
 -0.04502 -0.07506 -0.1718 -0.07248 -0.0434 
 [ 3.06058] [ 0.21863] [ 2.20659] [-2.07805] [ 0.29188] 
LIQ(-1) 0.114095 0.020582 0.955185 1.178683 -0.166875 
 -0.13751 -0.22927 -0.52479 -0.22139 -0.13256 
 [ 0.82972] [ 0.08977] [ 1.82014] [ 5.32403] [-1.25888] 
LIQ(-2) -0.185263 0.023751 -1.064622 -0.161594 0.134754 
 -0.13228 -0.22055 -0.50484 -0.21297 -0.12752 
 [-1.40051] [ 0.10769] [-2.10884] [-0.75875] [ 1.05673] 
DEPOSIT(-1) 0.071342 -0.572826 1.471848 -0.24033 1.040354 
 -0.17145 -0.28586 -0.65431 -0.27603 -0.16528 
 [ 0.41611] [-2.00390] [ 2.24947] [-0.87066] [ 6.29465] 
DEPOSIT(-2) 0.260262 0.357275 -0.800343 -0.005407 -0.061775 
 -0.19008 -0.31692 -0.72542 -0.30603 -0.18324 
 [ 1.36922] [ 1.12733] [-1.10329] [-0.01767] [-0.33713] 
C -0.202226 0.252795 -0.274443 0.150586 -0.020352 
 -0.07663 -0.12776 -0.29243 -0.12337 -0.07387 
 [-2.63915] [ 1.97871] [-0.93849] [ 1.22065] [-0.27552] 
      
 R-squared 0.534231 0.79058 0.400369 0.971856 0.848814 
 S.E. equation 0.035114 5.85E-02 0.134007 0.056533 0.03385 
 Log likelihood 87.44655 65.97595 31.19614 67.44497 88.98663 
VAR System  Statistics     
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 1.09E-13    
 Log likelihood  360.6652    
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VAR estimates for Algeria: 
32 observations     
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
     
 RGDP CAPOP DEPOSITS LIQ 
RGDP(-1) -0.018978 0.069904 0.009672 -0.73374 
 -0.23306 -0.3447 -0.14458 -0.15202 
 [-0.08143] [ 0.20280] [ 0.06689] [-4.82656] 
     
RGDP(-2) -0.330189 0.063437 -0.094076 0.916974 
 -0.23006 -0.34026 -0.14272 -0.15006 
 [-1.43524] [ 0.18644] [-0.65915] [ 6.11054] 
     
CAPOP(-1) 0.373649 0.873557 0.144505 -0.117401 
 -0.16836 -0.249 -0.10444 -0.10982 
 [ 2.21939] [ 3.50824] [ 1.38357] [-1.06906] 
     
CAPOP(-2) 0.262139 -0.290476 -0.133629 -0.068513 
 -0.1905 -0.28175 -0.11818 -0.12426 
 [ 1.37607] [-1.03097] [-1.13073] [-0.55137] 
     
DEPOSITS(-1) 0.709241 0.532606 0.824373 0.354327 
 -0.28694 -0.42439 -0.17801 -0.18717 
 [ 2.47173] [ 1.25499] [ 4.63107] [ 1.89310] 
     
DEPOSITS(-2) 0.041494 -0.020764 -0.332428 0.156556 
 -0.31203 -0.4615 -0.19357 -0.20353 
 [ 0.13298] [-0.04499] [-1.71732] [ 0.76919] 
     
LIQ(-1) 0.158478 0.281083 -0.034111 1.079656 
 -0.15268 -0.22581 -0.09472 -0.09959 
 [ 1.03800] [ 1.24477] [-0.36014] [ 10.8411] 
     
LIQ(-2) 0.196423 -0.208408 -0.095034 -0.194316 
 -0.17231 -0.25484 -0.10689 -0.11239 
 [ 1.13997] [-0.81780] [-0.88906] [-1.72892] 
     
Constant 3.949884 1.0274 1.110318 -0.252499 
 -0.95607 -1.41404 -0.59312 -0.62363 
 [ 4.13137] [ 0.72657] [ 1.87201] [-0.40489] 
     
CLINDEX 0.023855 0.003454 -0.010199 -0.017873 
 -0.0109 -0.01612 -0.00676 -0.00711 
 [ 2.18922] [ 0.21432] [-1.50877] [-2.51455] 
     
TREND 0.034248 -0.001299 -0.001061 -0.007059 
 -0.00769 -0.01138 -0.00477 -0.00502 
 [ 4.45193] [-0.11415] [-0.22223] [-1.40679] 
     
 R-squared 0.940272 0.813971 0.845567 0.957558 
 S.E. equation 0.073209 0.108277 0.045416 0.047753 
 Log likelihood 44.99547 32.47146 60.2736 58.6682 
VAR System Statistics     
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 1.12E-10   
 Log likelihood  2.12E+02   
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VAR estimates for Jordan: 
24 observations   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
 RGDP TRAD DEPOSIT 
RGDP(-1) 0.36345 0.066676 -0.127145 
 -0.19409 -0.50359 -0.15338 
 [ 1.87256] [ 0.13240] [-0.82896] 
    
RGDP(-2) 0.127488 -0.363172 0.098888 
 -0.15312 -0.39728 -0.121 
 [ 0.83260] [-0.91415] [ 0.81725] 
    
TRAD(-1) -0.107809 0.594803 0.023463 
 -0.09023 -0.23412 -0.07131 
 [-1.19478] [ 2.54062] [ 0.32905] 
    
TRAD(-2) 0.276532 -0.437242 0.056335 
 -0.08029 -0.20831 -0.06345 
 [ 3.44424] [-2.09897] [ 0.88791] 
    
DEPOSIT(-1) 0.448313 -1.219898 1.105941 
 -0.28859 -0.74877 -0.22806 
 [ 1.55346] [-1.62921] [ 4.84943] 
    
DEPOSIT(-2) 0.998411 -0.541782 -0.092279 
 -0.36278 -0.94127 -0.28669 
 [ 2.75208] [-0.57559] [-0.32188] 
    
Constant 0.135841 3.252887 -0.041448 
 -0.41181 -1.06846 -0.32543 
 [ 0.32986] [ 3.04446] [-0.12737] 
    
TREND -0.007273 -0.009857 0.000815 
 -0.00221 -0.00574 -0.00175 
 [-3.29000] [-1.71855] [ 0.46640] 
    
 R-squared 0.955865 0.698564 0.724504 
 S.E. equation 0.03947 0.102408 0.031191 
 Log likelihood 48.38416 25.50211 54.0342 
VAR System Statistics   
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 1.51E-08  
 Log likelihood 128.513  
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VAR estimates for Bahrain  
26 observations   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
 RGDP GOVGDP 
RGDP(-1) 0.369934 0.093627 
 -0.41732 -0.11555 
 [ 0.88645] [ 0.81028] 
   
RGDP(-2) -0.559526 0.104307 
 -0.40917 -0.11329 
 [-1.36747] [ 0.92068] 
   
GOVGDP(-1) -1.442767 1.136238 
 -1.56693 -0.43386 
 [-0.92076] [ 2.61891] 
   
GOVGDP(-2) -1.058429 0.208532 
 -1.58434 -0.43868 
 [-0.66806] [ 0.47536] 
   
C 4.703772 -0.763417 
 -1.51608 -0.41978 
 [ 3.10259] [-1.81861] 
   
TREND 0.00649 -0.001251 
 -0.00297 -0.00082 
 [ 2.18360] [-1.51975] 
   
 R-squared 0.675714 0.831776 
 S.E. equation 0.061792 0.017109 
 Log likelihood 38.90173 72.28974 
VAR System Statistics   
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 2.90E-07 
 Log likelihood  128.7348 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
67
APPENDIX C 
GRAPHS OF THE CIVIL LIBERTIES INDEX‡‡ 
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‡‡ The indices are measured such that the number one represent the highest degree of freedom and seven 
the lowest rating. 
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GRAPHS OF THE POLITICAL FREEDOM INDEX 
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ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD INDEX§§ 
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§§ Low scores are more desirable 
    
 
70
APPENDIX D 
SAUDI ARABIAN LIGHT CRUDE BY OPEC BETWEEN 1959 AND 2003 
2.0
2.4
2.8
3.2
3.6
4.0
4.4
60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00
LNOIL
 
 
UNIT ROOT TEST 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test   
 Intercept  Trend and Intercept  
 LM-statistics LM-statistics  
 1% 0.739 1% 0.216  
 5% 0.463 5% 0.146  
 10% 0.347 10% 0.119  
Log Oil Prices (44 Obs.)    
OIL   0.306485     I(0) at 5% intercept 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
    
 
71
VITA 
 
Massa W. Alrayes  
1223 Holly Drive   
Richardson, Texas 78050  
Email: masarayes@hotmail.com 
  
 
Education 
M.S. (Economics), Texas A&M University, College Station, 2005 
B.B.A. (Finance), The American University of Beirut, Lebanon, 2003 
 
Professional Experience 
Graduate Intern, Institute for School – University Partnerships, Texas A&M University 
System, Summer 2004 
Research Assistant, The Syrian Consulting Bureau for Development & Investment, 
Damascus, Syria, Fall 2003 
Assistant Auditor Intern,  Deloitte Touché Tohmatsu, Damascus , Syria, Summer 2002  
 
Languages and Skills 
Knowledge of VB programming, WINQSB, STATA, Crystal Ball, E-Views 
English and Arabic (fluent) and French (beginner) 
 
Activities and Accomplishments 
2004 – 2005  Texas A&M University: 
  J. Wayne Stark University Galleries, Gallery Guard   
  Bush School of Government & Public Service, Computer Services Assistant   
  
2002-2003 St. Jude Children Cancer Center in Lebanon, Volunteer  
 Recipient of Dean’s Honor List Scholarship  
Member of The American University of Beirut’s Syrian Cultural Club, 
Business Students Society, and Alumni Association  
 
1999-2000 Arts & Sciences Dean’s Honor List, The American University of Beirut  
Earned 20 %of college expenses through tutoring students in mathematics 
